Sarah C. M. Paine — Concepts to Navigate the Second Cold War

Overview

Sarah C. M. Paine, a historian and retired professor, argues that the post–Cold War period of relative stability is ending as territorial “continentalist” powers challenge the rules-based international order.

In his view, this shift is destroying wealth, weakening alliances, and increasing the danger of escalation, especially around Ukraine, Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz. His central claim is that democracies must respond through better strategic assessment, feasible objectives, stronger institutions, and renewed cooperation led increasingly by Europe and other democratic partners. He presents historical concepts—limited and unlimited war, “death ground,” value of the object, veto players, and strategic versus tactical action—as tools for understanding the current crisis.

Relevant source moment: [00:15]–[01:00], where Sarah C. M. Paine contrasts a rules-based, positive-sum order with a territorial, negative-sum one.

Main argument: strategic errors are creating a more dangerous international system

Sarah C. M. Paine’s causal chain is that the rules-based order enabled wealth and cooperation, while territorial competition and unilateral coercion destroy both.

He argues that recent policies—including tariffs, attacks or kidnappings involving political leaders, and what he calls “Operation Epic Blunder”—have created lasting damage because pivotal errors reduce the quality of all subsequent choices. His analysis assumes that states respond primarily to perceived threats and interests, not to abstract appeals or external preferences. When a country faces an unlimited objective—regime change, cultural destruction, or annihilation—it is placed on “death ground,” meaning that resistance becomes its only rational option.

Sarah C. M. Paine therefore expects targets such as Iran, or Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aims, to fight with extreme persistence.

Relevant source moment: [04:58]–[05:44], where he explains “death ground” and argues that existential threats can transform a dysfunctional society into a highly determined adversary. A second assumption is that strategic success cannot be judged by the quality of an individual operation. Tactical or operational brilliance can produce strategic disaster if it strengthens the enemy, destroys alliances, or creates long-term economic costs.

His proposed remedy is a sequence of sound assessment, a feasible policy objective, a strategy for reaching it, and continuous reassessment. Relevant source moment: [15:48]–[16:19], where he presents assessment, feasible objectives, strategy, and reassessment as the foundations of sound policy.

Evidence and historical examples

Sarah C. M. Paine uses several historical comparisons to support his framework.

He contrasts limited wars, in which the defeated government survives and must eventually negotiate, with unlimited wars involving regime destruction or genocide. He also distinguishes positive objectives, which can be visibly achieved, from negative objectives such as deterrence, which require continuous effort and are usually noticed only when they fail. His examples include Bismarck’s wars as limited conflicts, World War II in Europe as a war with unlimited objectives on both sides, and the Pacific theater of World War II as a mixed-objective war.

He uses the Chinese Civil War to show how the primary enemy can change: Mao Zedong’s Communist forces and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists temporarily prioritized Japan when it invaded China, then resumed their internal conflict after Japan’s defeat. Relevant source moment: [07:58]–[09:06], where he explains changing enemy priorities through the Chinese Civil War and the failure of the United States to account for them. The Korean War illustrates his concept of veto players.

According to Sarah C. M. Paine, the conflict continued because different actors disagreed about ending it, and the Soviet Union’s position changed only after Joseph Stalin’s death and the resulting leadership struggle.

He generalizes from this that long-running conflicts may persist because one or more parties can block resolution, and that policy planners should prepare for periods of leadership transition in dictatorships. He also uses Pearl Harbor to distinguish operational from strategic judgment. He describes the attack as an exceptionally effective naval operation but argues that its strategic consequences—including the destruction of Japanese cities and defeat of Japan—made it disastrous overall.

He applies the same distinction to the public humiliation of Volodymyr Zelenskyy by Donald Trump and J. D. Vance, presenting it as a tactical political performance that could produce strategic damage by encouraging other countries to distance themselves from the United States.

Relevant source moment: [12:13]–[14:12], where Sarah C. M. Paine contrasts the operational success of Pearl Harbor with its strategic consequences and applies the framework to contemporary diplomacy.

Distinctive insights

One of Sarah C. M. Paine’s most useful concepts is “value of the object”: the importance each side assigns to the outcome.

People living in the war zone generally value the result more than neighboring or distant actors because they bear the direct costs. Applied to Iran, Sarah C. M.

Paine argues that the conflict is existential for Iranians in a way it is not for Israel, the United States, or more distant political actors. This asymmetry means that external powers may underestimate an opponent’s willingness to absorb costs. It also suggests that a weaker actor can remain committed when the stronger actor’s political attention, public support, or strategic patience is limited.

Relevant source moment: [05:59]–[06:44], where he explains why local populations usually attach greater value to the object of conflict. Another distinctive insight is the difference between destruction and construction. Sarah C.

M. Paine argues that it is easier to damage infrastructure, energy systems, alliances, and confidence than to rebuild them. He presents the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic vulnerability because Iran’s ability to disrupt shipping could impose costs far beyond the immediate theater, while reopening a narrow sea may be much harder than closing it.

He also argues that institutions are not merely buildings or formal organizations. They are arrangements through which people coordinate around shared problems, making collective action more powerful than isolated national or corporate responses. Relevant source moment: [10:56]–[11:43] on the asymmetry between destruction and construction, and [22:58]–[23:28] on institutions as organized cooperation.

Predictions and conditions

Sarah C. M. Paine predicts that Europe will increasingly assume leadership of the democratic core as the United States retreats from its previous role.

He identifies Europe, Canada, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Australia as potential members of this broader democratic grouping, and expects them to reform existing institutions or create parallel ones. This forecast depends on Europe overcoming bureaucratic delays, coordinating defense and economic policy, developing independent technological and financial infrastructure, and using the present crisis as a catalyst for institutional change. It would be weakened if European states failed to cooperate, continued relying on fragmented national responses, or if the United States restored credible leadership and alliance commitments.

Relevant source moment: [17:57]–[19:36], where he argues that leadership is shifting toward Europe and urges democracies to use the crisis to build stronger institutions. Sarah C. M.

Paine also predicts that Iran will retain the ability and incentive to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage once it has demonstrated that capability. He expects conflicts involving existential objectives to persist because the targeted side has little reason to compromise. These forecasts would be weakened by a negotiated settlement, a credible deterrent that changes the target’s calculations, or evidence that Sarah C.

M. Paine’s characterization of the actors’ objectives is incorrect. Relevant source moment: [10:41]–[11:28], where he applies his framework to Iran, Israel, the United States, and the Strait of Hormuz.

Practical implications for governments, businesses, and civic leaders

The most direct policy implication is to assess both sides of the balance sheet: not only one’s own strengths and the opponent’s weaknesses, but also one’s own vulnerabilities and the opponent’s strengths. Policymakers should then define objectives that are achievable rather than maximal, especially when the opposing side views the conflict as existential. Sarah C.

M. Paine also implies that leaders should distinguish tactical gains from strategic outcomes. A move that satisfies a domestic audience or wins a short-term military engagement may still be harmful if it weakens alliances, encourages balancing against the country, or damages long-term prosperity.

Relevant source moment: [15:48]–[16:34], where he links feasible objectives to realistic assessment and identifies reopening the Strait of Hormuz as a difficult strategic problem. For businesses, the practical lesson is to treat the rules-based order as an operating condition rather than a background assumption. Sarah C.

M. Paine warns that if freedom of navigation, contract enforcement, and protection from expropriation weaken, companies may face higher costs, political risk, and pressure to rely on informal payments or private security. For European and Nordic leaders, he recommends strengthening alliances, building institutions that allow firms and countries to act together, and communicating with counterparts in the United States.

He specifically urges business leaders not to fund political forces that they believe threaten democratic institutions, security, and prosperity. Relevant source moment: [19:36]–[20:35] on the business costs of institutional breakdown, and [24:21]–[25:22] on organizing, coalition-building, and leadership.